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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE STATE OF UTAH

WII_jl..JIAM l\L O'GARA, Executor
of the Estate of NANCY E.
I-IIRIGARAY, Deceased,
Ap r~ellanl,

C.ase No. 8527
-vs.-

ARCHIE FINDLAY

'
Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts as set forth in the Brief of Appellant are
substantially correct.
1
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Sometime prior to April 26, 1949, the Respondent,
Archie :b....,indlay, received a letter from his aunt, ~frs.
Nancy E. Hirigaray, requesting that he come to Layton
because she had son1e matters to take up with him. In
response to this letter, Archie Findlay came to Layton,
at which time he was advised that Mrs. Hirigaray wanted
to convey her property to him. For this purpose, they
went to the Barnes Banking Company in Farmington,
Utah, where they talked ·with :Jlr. Gailey, who is now the
president of said bank. After :Jirs. Hirigaray had explained to }Ir. Gailey 'vhat she desired to do, the record
shows that he explained to her that in order to have a
valid deed, it had to be delivered. Counsel for the Appellant has attempted to imply that the deliver~~ may have
been in trust for the benefit of others. ''7e respectfully
submit that this is not an issue before this Court. If,
however, in fact, this "\\-'"as a delivery in trust, the Appellant's case would still fail because the sole question before
the Court is, to-wit: '';as there a valid delivery' A valid
delivery c.an be n1ade in trust as "ill be 1nore fully set
forth under Point I.
~.,ron1

the transeript there can be no doubt but that
a delivery of this deed did, in fact, take place. For example, at page 28 of the transcript beginning at line 15,
've find the follo,ving language by j\fr. Findlay while
being cross-exa1nined by 1\fr. Hardy:
Q.

'Vhat did she say again f

A.

She said she understood it. He said when
you hand this deed to ~fr. Findlay, it is his.
It is yours no longer, and she said she understood i~t.
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Q. After Mr. Gailey made that statement, what
happened~

A.

She gave it to me.

Q. Did she give it to you
A.

personally~

Yes, Sir.

At page 36 of the tr.anscript beginning at line 6
when the witness, Mr. Gailey, was being cross-exa1nined
by Mr. Hardy, he made the following statement:
A. 'V ell, she asked me to draw up a deed. I
fixed up the deed and she gave it to Mr. Hirigaray, not 1Iirigaray, to Arch Findlay and he
.asked rrte to keep it for him, to file it away in the
vault, which I promised to do. I explained to
nirs. Hirigaray vvhen she gave the deed, I told her
it was being delivered to Findlay ***.
I explained to the1n that there couldn't be
any strings attached to the deed. When it was
delivered to 1\Ir. li..,indlay, it was his deed, and he
handed it to me. vV e were holding it for safekeeping for him. It tuottlcln't be delivered to anyone else than him, until it is ordered, ***.
POINT I.
THE SOLE QUESTION TO BE DECIDED IN DETERMINING THE VALIDITI:- OF A DEED IS WHETHER OR
NOT THE DEED WAS DELIVERED TO THE GRANTEE.
THE FACT THAT THE GRANTOR REMAINS ON THE
PREMISES, KEEPS IT INSURED, .COLLECTS THE RENT,
PAYS THE TAXES AND EXERCISES ALL OTHER INCIDENTS OF O·WNERSHIP, HAS NO BEARING ON THE
QUESTION OF A VALID DELIVERY.

The case at hand appears to be on all fours 'vith the
Utah case of Woolley v. Taylor, et al., 45 U. 227, 144 P.
1094, (1914). In that case, the facts are as follows:
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Shortly after acquiring the prop·erty, the purchaser
moved on to the property where he continued to live
with his daughter from that time until his death. lie had
one son in addition to the daughter who lived on the
premises with hint. He had drawn a deed conveying the
property to his daughter, but the deed was not recorded
until the day after hi~ death. Beginning on page 230, line
12, we quote directly from that decision:
"After his purchase, he talked 'vith the conveyancer and expressed an intention to give the
property to his daughter, but to retain a life estate, and expressed a wish to make a deed and
'put it away' until he was dead, \Yhen his daughter
could get it. The conveyancer informed him, such
a deed would not be good and that :
'Unless you deliver the deed, she can't
get any title; you must deliver the deed to
her now; then she can do .as she wants wit~
it-put it a\vay or destroy it or anything
else.'
"The father and daughter "~ere both present.
The conveyancer thereupon dre'v a "'"arranty deed
conveying the property to the daughter by the
father. The father signed and aekno\vledged it
and then in the presence of the conveyancer,
handed it to his daughter. After that, ilnproveInents "~ere n1ade on the property and \vere paid
for b)· hin1. *** During all that tune the property
was insured and a~sessed in his na1ne, and all
insurance ~u1d taxt>s paid by hiln. *** lTnder such
circuinsta.nres, the father liYing" on the premises
and 1naking such pay1nents is not inconsistent
'vith ownership of the property in her."
rrhe Court "'"ent on to hold that the deed had, in
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fact, been delivered to the daughter.
This, we contend, is precisely what happened in the
case at hand. lVIr. Gailey advised Mrs. Hirigaray that
in order to rna.ke a conveyance legal and stand up in
Court, it had to be delivered and it was delivered by
the decedent to Archie Findlay, who, in turn, delivered
it to Mr. Gailey to keep for him, and lVIr. Gailey testified
that he would not have delivered it to any other person,
but that it was being held by him for Mr. Findlay.
There is absolutely no evidence in the record from
which it could ever he inferred that the deed was not
delivered. This is the one place where this case is different from all others where they have held that the
delivery was not good. 1Tor example, in the case of
First Security Bank of Utah v. Burgie, et ux., ______ Utah
...... , 251 P. 2nd 297, which is the only case relied on by
the Appellant in his Brief, there was definite conflict
in the evidence as to the delivery of the deed. On the
one hand, the proponents of a valid delivery testified
that the deed and bill of sale were in the possession of the
defendant grantee and that he kept them, along with
other valuable papers, in a red chocolate box over his
kitchen sink and that the deceased had made many
statements to the effect that in case he should die,
everything was taken care of.
On the other hand, the record shows that irrnnediately upon grantor's death, the defendant grantee took
possession of grantor's keys, stating that there was a
deed in the vault which he intended to get and record as
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soon as possible and refused to allow any witnesses to
be present when he opened the hasernent vault. This,
of course, strongly indicates that the deed had not been
in the possession of the grantee but was, in fact, in the
possession of the grantor in his safe and could only be
obtained by use of the grantor's keys. In holding that
the deed had not been delivered and was still in the
possession of the grantor, the Court stated:
"While upon an appeal of a case in equity,
this Court may review the Findings of Fact as
well as the Conclusions of La,,~; nevertheless, the
findings of the trial Court will not be set aside
unless it n1anifestly appears that the Court has
misapplied proven facts or made findings clearly
against the weight of the evidence. Gibbons v.
Bryan, ______ U. ______ , 230 P. 2nd 983; Stanley v.
Stanley, Supra, and cases cited therein. The
record substantially supports the lower court's
findings with respect to non-delivery of the
deed and bill of sale."
It is interesting to note that this ease ''Tas decided
in the lower court by Judge Co,vley, the san1e judge before \vhoin the rase at hand "\Yas tried.
\Ve strongly contend that had there not been a conflict in the Pvidence outlined above, the CouTt "\Yould not
have sustained the lo"\ver courfs decision and the result
would have been the other "\Yay and the .arts of O"\vnership by the grantor "~ould not have been inconsistent "\Yith
the holding of a valid deliYer~T· This conclusion 1nust
follo"\v in the lig·ht of other decisions upon this sa1ne
point in the State of Utah.
The Woolley e.ase cited above is one good exrunple
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on this point. To point up the problem even more clearly,
let us take the ease of a delivery of a deed to .a third
party, for delivery to the grantee after the de,ath of
the grantor and not before. In this case, the grantee
would not even be aware of the deed being in existence.
The grantor "\vould obviously still go on exercising all
of the acts of ownership such as p.aying taxes, keeping
the property insured, collecting rents and stating to
people it was his and yet the deed would be valid, providing he has plaeed the same beyond his control to recall
it and in this ease at hand, ~{r. Gailey testified that he
was holding the deed in s.afe keeping for Mr. Findlay and
Mr. Findlay only. In the case of Singleton v. Kelly, et.
al., 61 Utah 277, 212 P. 63, (1923), the Court quotes with
favor from the California case of vVilliams v. Kidd, 170
Cal. 631, 151 Pac. 1, as follows:
"It is well settled that a person may make a
conveyance of property and place it in the hands
of a third party to be delivered to the grantee
named in it on the death of the grantor and that
such a delivery will be effectual to pass a present
title to the property to the grantee, if the intention of the grantor is to make such delivery absolute and place it beyond his power thereafter to
revoke or control the deed."
To the same effect, we have the case of Losee, et. ux.
v. Jones, et. ux., 120 Utah 385, 235 P. 2nd 132, (1951).
The mother drew up deeds to different parts of her
property naming various of her children as grantees.
The Court stated as follows:
"The deeds were not delivered to the sons
and daughter. However, were placed in a safe
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deposit box in a bank by the mother. This box
was one held by the ntother and one of her daughters jointly. Later on when quite ill, she had the
deeds brought to her. She made a correction in
one and executed another. She then handed all
of the deeds to one of her daughters and instructed her to deliver them, after her death, to
the named grantees. The daughter then placed
the deeds in a bureau drawer in the same room
where her mother w.as ill. After death, they were
delivered. The daughter testified that had the
mother requested the deeds, she would have given
them back. The Court said:
'Are these facts sufficient to constitute
a delivery? In the case of Singleton v. Kelly,
61 Utah 277, 212 Pac. 63, this Court approved
the applicable principals \vhich had almost
universally acceptance: That where a grantor
executes a deed and places it in the hands
of a third party for delivery after the death
of the grantor, with the intent that the deed
and its delivery are absolute, that the title
in fact passes and the third p.arty then holdR
the deed as trustee for the grantee.' ''
Again in the case of Burnhan r. Eschler, 116 Utah
61,209 P. 2nd 96, (1949), they state:
~~That

grantor, after the execution of deeds,
continued to pay the taxes on the property, carried insurance in her na1ne and expressed to
various persons the desire to se II a part or all of
the property is not, 1cheu the relatio-nBhip u·hic~
e.r-isted behreen the grantor and the grantee tS
taken info cousiderafl~ou. ineonsistent \vith the
actual deliverY of the deed ***. Nor \vas the
finding of deli;'"er~~ by the Io,ver courts precluded
hY the fnet. that nJrs. Schank chose to deliver the
d~ed to a third part~,. instructing hin1 to deliver
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the deed to the grantee after her death instead of
delivering them directly herself to the grantee.''
It is interesting to note that the relationship which
·was referred to in this case, was exactly the same as that
which exists in the case at hand; i.e., aunt and nephew.
Again in the ease of fJ7'ilson v. Wilson) 32 Utah 169,
89 Pac. 443 (1907), where the father was about to remarry and he conveyed his property to his son, second
wife attempted to have the conveyance set aside for lack
of delivery in order that she could take her statutory
one-third interest. The Court held that where a grantor
delivers a deed to a third person absolutely as his deed,
without reserration, and without intending to reserve
any control over the instru1nent, though it is not to be
delivered to the grantee until the grantor's death, the
deed, when delivered, is valid and takes effect on the
first delivery.
To exactly the same affect is the case of Cappmayer)
et. al. v. Wilkenson) et. al.J 53 Utah 236, 177 Pac. 763
(1919). In this case deeds and mortgages were n1ade to
grantor's children just before he remarried and he deliveTed them to the ·utah County Abstract c·ompany of
Provo, Utah, with directions to deliver the deeds to
grantees upon his death. The Court cited the Wilson v.
Wilson case in sustaining the lower court's language:
""\\tThere a grantor delivers a deed to a third
person absolutely as his deed without reservation,
and without intending to reserve any control over
the instrument, though it is not to be delivered to
the grantee until the grantor's death, the deed,
when delivered, is valid and takes effect from
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the first delivery."
C~ase!s

front other jurisdictions holding to the same
rule of law are as follows: Cox v. McCartney, 34 Tenn.
App. 235, 263 S.E. 2nd 763; Jobse v. U.S. National Bank
of Portland, 142 Ore. 692, 21 P. 2nd 221; Jorgenson v.
Jorgenson, 74 S.D. 239, 51 N.W. 2nd 632; Grouse v.
H ousner, 322 Mich. 448, 34 N.W. 2nd 38; Burton v. Peace,
206 N.C. 99, 173 S.E. 4; and Camp v. Guarantee Trust
Company, 262 Mich. 223, 247 N.W. 162.
POINT II.
THERE IS A S'TRONG PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF
A VALID DELIVER.Y WHERE IT IS RECORDED BY THE
GRANTEE AFTER DEATH OF THE GRANTOR. ONE WHO
WOULD OVERCOME THIS PRESUMPTION WHICH FLOWS
FROM THE RECORDING THERE·OF HAS THE BURDEN
OF PRODUCING COMPETENT EVIDEN·CE OF NONDELIVER.Y.

At the trial only two witnesses \Vere called by the
Appell ant to prove their case; the Respondentt, Archie
Findlay, and the president of the Barnes Banking Company, Mr. J. R. Gailey. Both of these witnesses testified
that the deed was delivered by the deceased to ~fr.
].,indlay who in turn delivered it to 1Ir. Gailey, \Vho held
it at Mr. Findlay's direction. There has been no evidence
'vha.tsoever introduced to the affect that there W'"as not a
delivery but, at best, there has been son1e inference that
the delivery was rnade in trust 'vhich, of course, as indicated, is not an issue before the Court at this tiine. In
the Utah case of Bertoch v. Gailey, et. a1., 116 Utah 101,
208 P. 2nd 953, (1949), the Court sta~tes:
1

''One 'vho 'vould overcorne presurnption of
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delivery of deed, which flows from the recordation thereof, had burden of producing competent
evidence of non-delivery or show a conditional
delivery with the conditions unfulfilled, and mere
avermenrt of non-delivery and offer of evidence
which created so1ne suspicion, was insufficient to
discharge that burden or impose upon the adversary the burden of affirmatively proving .actual
delivery.''
(Incidentally, this is the same J. R. Gailey involved
in this case who is the principal witness in the case at
hand.)
In the case of Knighton v. ]1/fanning, et. al., 84 Utah
1, 33 P. 2nd 401., (1934), 'rilda Larson and Oscar B. Berglund lived together for ten years but were not married.
Three days after death of 'J~ilda, Oscar recorded a deed
to her property to hi1nself. The Court held that the deed
being in his possession and properly executed by the decedent, gave rise to a presurr1ption that there was a valid
delivery and one attempting to prove otherwise had the
burden of sustaining proof. Citing Chamberlin v. Larson,
83 Utah 420, 29 P. 2nd 355, and Fish v. Poorman, 85 Kan.
237, 116 P. 898, Jones v. Betz, 203 Iowa 767, and other
eases. Also, recently in the Utah case of Morgan v.
Sorenson, 3 Utah 2nd 428, 286 P. 2nd 229, (1955), the
Court even went further and held that where a deed,
executed and ackno-vvledged, is found in the hands of the
grantee, its invalidity can he established only by clear
and convincing evidence.
The plaintiff has offered no evidence which would
even tend to establish that the deed in question was not
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actually and physically delivered. On the contrary, as
pointed out, the only two witnesses called, both stated
unequivocally that the deed was executed and delivered
by the decedent to Archie Findlay, who in turn gave it to
Mr. Gailey, who held it subject to Archie Findlay's
order. We submit that the case at hand is much stronger
than any ease previously argued before this Court and
that the decision of the lower court should be sustained.
POINT III.
THE DEAD MAN'S STATUTE DOES NOT APPLY IN
A SITUATION WHERE THERE IS A THIRD PARTY WITNESS TO THE TRANSACTION WHO CAN SUBSTANTIATE
THE PARTY WHO WOULD OTHERWISE BE DISQUALIFIED UNDER THIS LAW.

It is extremely difficult for me in reading Section
74-24-2 UCA (1953), to know just what class of witnesses
the legislature intended to exclude unde-r the "Dead ~Ian"
section of our code. The confusion, however, is ren1oved
in the case of JJ;faxfield v. Sainsbury, 110 l~tah 280, 172
P. 2nd 122, wherein they state:
"The purpose of the statute is to guard
against the temptation to give false testin1ony in
regard to a transaction 'Yith a deceased person
by the surviving party 'vhen the transaction is involved in a la"~ suit and death has sealed the
n1outh of the other party. Furthertnore, the
statute seeks to put the t'Yo parties upon tern1s
of equality in regard to giving evidence of the
transaction. 3 tT ones ev. 790; ~Iiller v. Livingston,
31 Utah 415, 88 P. 338. It "~as never intended that
this section should be used for the purpose of
surpressing the truth. On the eontrary~ the statute's sole purpose is to prevent the proving by
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false testimony of claims against the estate of a
deceased person."
Peter M. Lowe, attorney for the estate, has objected
to the testimony of ~1r.. Findlay pertaining to the conversations which took pl•ace at the time the deed in question was executed and delivered and specifically to his
testifying as to what Mr. Gailey stated at that time. It
should be borne in mind that the witness was called by
!:Ir. Lowe himself and on direct examination, all of these
specific points were opened by him. For example, on
page 18 of the transcript, beginning at line 30, we find
the following language:
Q.

Did you have any discussion with Mrs. Hirigaray before that document was given to
you~

A.

I did.

Again on page 24 of the transcript beginning at line
17, we find the follo,ving question propounded by Mr.
Lowe:

Q.

Now getting back to the day, I think we identified it as April 26, 1949, when that docunlent was made, when you were at the Barnes
Banking Company, do you recall what the
conversations were at that time~

Again on page 25, line 1, the following question:
Q.

Do you remember other conversations at that
time when the deed was made at the Barnes
Bank by anyone~

Can the party who on direct examination opens all
of the questions pertaining to the conversations which
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may norrnally fall within the provisions of the Dead
Man's Statutes, object to the same matters being inquired
into on cross-examination~ I feel, obviously not Furtherrnore, where there were other witnesses present at
the time the statements were made, it is apparent that
the possibilities of falsification ~anish and, therefore,
the only re~ason for excluding the testimony, would he for
the purpose of supressing the truth, which the court in
the ~{ansfield case expressly stated should not be tolerated.
CONCLUSION
The sole issue before this Court is the one of delive-ry. Was the deed delivered by the grantor to the
grantee~

The lower court after reviewing the evidence and
memorandums submitted by the counsel for the parties,
made the following Findings of Fact:
"That prior to the execution and delivery
of said deed, the decedent \vas advised by the witness, J. R. Gailey, that before the deed would be
valid, it would have to be delivered.
"That the said Nancy E. Hirigaray executed
said deed and then and there delivered the sa1ne
to the defendant, \Yho then handed the s.ame to the
witness, J. R. Gailey, for safekeeping.''
Fron1 said findings, the Court 1nade the follo,ving
Conclusions of La'v:
"That on or about April 2G, 1949, the decedent, Nancy E. Hirigaray, \Yas the owner in fee
sim.ple of the real property described above, toSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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ge.ther with the water rights, improvements and
appurtenances thereunto belonging, and that on
said date she executed a valid deed to s~aid property conveying the same to her nephew, Archie
Findlay, the defendant herein.
"That upon the execution of said deed, the
decedent made a valid delivery thereof to the
defendant."
~rhere

is no evidence in the reeord which will refute
these F,indings of Fact or give rise to any other Conclusions of La,v. The Appellant's have failed to sustain the
burden of proving non-delivery of the deed in question
and the decision of the lower court should be sustained.
Respectfully submitted,
REX W. HARDY,
WILLIAM H. KING,

Attorneys for Respondent.
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